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At the IEEE Workshop on Information Forensics and Security in 2012, Veugen introduced two ways of improving a well-known secure comparison protocol by Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard, which u...
Correction on “Further Improving Efficiency of Higher-Order Masking Schemes by Decreasing Randomness Complexity”
masking scheme side-channel attacks probing model
2017/12/27
Provably secure masking schemes always require too many random generations, which significantly increases the implementation cost. Recently in IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY (...
"HILA5 Pindakaas": On the CCA security of lattice-based encryption with error correction
Post-quantum cryptography KEM RLWE
2017/12/19
We show that HILA5 is not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate a key-recovery attack on HILA5 using an active attack on reused keys. The attack works around the error...
On Reliability, Reconciliation, and Error Correction in Ring-LWE Encryption
Ring-LWE Reconciliation Post-Quantum Encryption
2017/5/23
We describe a new reconciliation method for Ring-LWE that has a significantly smaller failure rate than previous proposals while reducing ciphertext size and the amount of randomness required. It is b...
Key Reconciliation Protocols for Error Correction of Silicon PUF Responses
physical unclonable function error correction key reconciliation
2016/12/8
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are promising primitives for lightweight integrated circuit authentication. Indeed, by extracting an identifier from random process variations, they allow each ins...
Ring-LWE Ciphertext Compression and Error Correction: Tools for Lightweight Post-Quantum Cryptography
Practical Post-Quantum Cryptography Lattice Cryptography Ring-LWE
2016/12/7
Some lattice-based public key cryptosystems allow one to transform ciphertext from one lattice or ring representation to another efficiently and without knowledge of public and private keys. In this w...
Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem -- Correction and Improvements
Correction Improvements
2015/12/24
The Modular Inversion Hidden Number Problem (MIHNP) was introduced by Boneh, Halevi and Howgrave-Graham in Asiacrypt 2001 (BHH'01). They provided two heuristics - in Method I, two-third of the output ...
Applying Cryptographic Acceleration Techniques to Error Correction
polynomial Barrett BCH error correcting codes
2015/12/23
Modular reduction is the basic building block of many publickey
cryptosystems. BCH codes require repeated polynomial reductions
modulo the same constant polynomial. This is conceptually very similar...
Protecting PUF Error Correction by Codeword Masking
Physical Unclonable Functions Side-Channel Analysis
2014/3/12
One of the main applications of Physical Unclonable Functions~(PUFs) is unique key generation. While the advantages of PUF-based key extraction and embedding have been shown in several papers, physica...
Efficient 2-Round General Perfectly Secure Message Transmission: A Minor Correction to Yang and Desmedt's Protocol
Protocol General Perfectly
2012/3/28
At Asiacrypt~'10, Yang and Desmedt proposed a number of perfectly secure message transmission protocols in the general adversary model. However, there is a minor flaw in the 2-round protocol in an und...
Efficient 2-Round General Perfectly Secure Message Transmission: A Minor Correction to Yang and Desmedt's Protocol
perfectly secure message transmission protocols minor flaw transmit multiple messages
2011/6/9
At Asiacrypt~'10, Yang and Desmedt proposed a number of perfectly secure message transmission protocols in the general adversary model. However, there is a minor flaw in the 2-round protocol in an und...
A correction to“Efficient and Secure Comparison for On-Line Auctions”
cryptosystem On-Line Auctions secure
2009/6/5
In this note, we describe a correction to the cryptosystem
proposed in [1, 2]. Although the correction is small and does not af-
fect the performance of the protocols from [1, 2], it is necessary as...
Given a corrupted word w = (w1, . . . ,wn) from a Reed-Solomon code of distance d, there
are many ways to efficiently find and correct its errors. But what if we are instead given
(gw1 , . . . , gwn...